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Life and Civil Death in the Ocean
State: Resurrecting Life-Prisoners’
Right to Access Courts in Rhode
Island
James Michael Kovach*

“The flames sawed in the wind and the embers paled and
deepened and paled and deepened like the bloodbeat of
some living thing eviscerate upon the ground before them
and they watched the fire which does contain within it
something of men themselves inasmuch as they are less
without it and are divided from their origins and are
exiles.” –Cormac McCarthy 1
INTRODUCTION

The concept of civil death, or “the state of a person who, though
possessing natural life, has lost all his civil rights, and as to them,
is considered as dead,” is anything but new, and its practice is far
from unique to Rhode Island. 2 In fact, punishing a criminal by
stripping him of his citizenship, divorcing him of all his rights, and
thus regarding him as dead has been practiced since at least the
Romans. 3 In Roman law, civil death was typically reserved for
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2020. I want to thank everyone who helped me write this Comment. Professor
Hassel, thank you for your time and expertise. To my parents, Jim and Jill
Kovach, who taught me all that I know, thank you for everything.
1. CORMAC MCCARTHY, BLOOD MERIDIAN OR THE EVENING REDNESS IN THE
WEST 255 (1985).
2. WALTER A. SHUMAKER & GEORGE FOSTER LONGSDORF, THE CYCLOPEDIC
DICTIONARY OF LAW 257 (1901).
3. CHARLES PHINEAS SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 40
(1917).
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punishment of serious crimes, as an accoutrement to being
“condemned to exile . . . sentenced to be deported to an island, or . .
. condemned to the mines.” 4 In the United States, this “vestige of
medieval jurisprudence” has historically been embodied in state
statutes that eliminate most or all of a convicted felon’s civil rights
upon receiving a sentence of life in prison.5 Civil death in the
United States has declined since the mid-twentieth century, but
Rhode Island has yet to repeal its civil death statute. 6
In Rhode Island, the civil death statute, titled “Life Prisoners
Deemed Civilly Dead,” requires that “every person imprisoned . . .
for life shall, with respect to . . . all civil rights and relations of any
nature whatsoever, be deemed to be dead in all respects, as if his or
her natural death had taken place at the time of conviction.” 7 To
the extent that life-prisoners in Rhode Island are capable of being
released from prison on parole, the civil death statute makes no
allowance for such parolees to regain civil life and repossess their
rights. 8 The real affects of Rhode Island’s civil death statute were
recently on display in Gallop v. Adult Correctional Institutions. 9 In
4. Id. at 40. A convicted Roman criminal, not condemned to civil death,
could nevertheless expect to suffer an impairment to his so-called “civic honor”
or reputation so severe as to suffer what was known as “infamia,” or infamy.
Id. at 41. An infame was “excluded from public offices and the right to vote . . .
[and] mak[e] a will,” and existed in a condition that is remarkably similar to
the “Anglo-American deprivation of certain civil and political rights,” which
still continues to this day. Id. at 41.
5. Ronald Eisenman, Civil Death in New York, 14 INTRAMURAL L. REV.
N.Y.U. 170, 170 (1958–1959). Civil death statutes typically required a civilly
dead person to surrender his “property rights, contract rights, the capacity to
sue or to be sued, the citizenship status, insurance [rights], the right to make
a will” and the right to vote. Id.
6. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the
Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012).
7. 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (1956). The civil death statute provides, in
full:
Every person imprisoned in the adult correctional institutions for life
shall, with respect to all rights of property, to the bond of matrimony
and to all civil rights and relations of any nature whatsoever, be
deemed to be dead in all respects, as if his or her natural death had
taken place at the time of conviction. However, the bond of matrimony
shall not be dissolved, nor shall the rights to property or other rights
of the husband or wife of the imprisoned person be terminated or
impaired, except on the entry of a lawfully obtained decree for divorce.
Id.
8. See 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 13-6-1, 13-8-13.
9. Gallop v. Adult Corr. Insts., 182 A.3d 1137 (R.I. 2018).
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this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed that a
plaintiff’s negligence claim was properly dismissed because, as a
result of his previous life sentence, he was deemed civilly dead and
thus prohibited from asserting any civil actions.10 The urgency of
Gallop is amplified by its timing. Only two weeks before the Court
heard arguments in Gallop, the Rhode Island Legislature
introduced a bill, which, if enacted, would have completely repealed
the civil death statute. 11
The civil death statute openly and egregiously violates the
Access to Courts Clause (“AC Clause”) of the Rhode Island
Constitution, which entitles Rhode Islanders to pursue remedies in
state courts.12 The statute further offends the United States
Constitution as an impermissible bar of life-prisoners’ right to
access courts, in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.13
For the reasons
expounded in this Comment, the Rhode Island Legislature should
repeal the civil death statute outright. Otherwise, Rhode Island
courts must invalidate the civil death statute as unconstitutional
and irredeemably against public policy.
Part I of this Comment examines the Rhode Island Supreme
Court’s application of the civil death statute in Gallop. 14 This
section will illuminate the statute’s effect on Rhode Island lifeprisoners’ ability to bring claims in court and, accordingly, call
attention to the court’s improvident holding. Part II surveys the
states that have overturned civil death statutes on the grounds that
they violated the AC Clause of their respective state constitutions,
which contain language similar to that of Rhode Island’s AC

10. Id. at 1143.
11. See S.B. 2269, 145th Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2018). The bill to
repeal the civil death statute was recommended for further study by the Rhode
Island Senate Committee on the Judiciary on February 13, 2018, but
subsequently was not passed into law.
12. See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5. The AC Clause provides, in full:
Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by
having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which may be
received in one’s person, property, or character. Every person ought
to obtain right and justice freely, and without purchase, completely
and without denial; promptly and without delay; conformably to the
laws.
Id.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
14. See Gallop, 182 A.3d. at 1141–45.
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Clause. 15 This survey highlights the analyses used by those states
in scrutinizing the constitutionality of their own civil death statutes
and lays the foundation for Rhode Island courts to follow. Part III
of this Comment analyzes the United States Supreme Court’s
approach to prisoner access-to-courts challenges under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
underscores that Rhode Island’s civil death statute is not rationally
related to the predictable and dubious
state interests often
advanced in justification of restricting life-prisoners’ access to
courts. 16 Concluding, Part IV challenges the Rhode Island
Legislature to return civil life to Rhode Island’s life-prisoners,
repeal the civil death statute outright, and restore life-prisoners’
right to access courts. Otherwise, this challenge falls heavily on
Rhode Island courts to enforce both the state and United States
Constitutions, and thus invalidate the civil death statute as
unconstitutional and against public policy.
I. THE RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT REACHED AN IMPROVIDENT AND
UNSUSTAINABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVIL DEATH STATUTE IN
GALLOP V. ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS

From the outset, the Rhode Island Supreme Court appeared to
have its hands tied in Gallop. The court noted that by the year
1939, only eighteen states still enforced civil death, and today, New
York and the Virgin Islands are the only other jurisdictions that
continue to impose civil death on life-prisoners. 17 Despite the
national trend whereby civil death statues and the associated loss
of civil rights for convicted prisoners “have almost all but vanished,”
the court nonetheless lamented that “[r]epeal is the province of the
Legislature.” 18
Prior to Gallop, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had
previously held that, although the Legislature may place
reasonable limits on the guarantees of the AC Clause, “[t]he total
denial of access to the courts” would “render this constitutional

15. See Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001); Chesapeake Utils.
Corp. v. Hopkins, 340 A.2d 154 (Del. 1975); Davis v. Pullium, 484 P.2d 1306
(Okla. 1971); Lloyd v. Farkash, 476 So. 2d 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
16. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817
(1977); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
17. Gallop, 182 A.3d at 1141.
18. Id.
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protection worthless.” 19 Nevertheless, the Gallop court declared
that because the civil death statute “unambiguously mandate[s]
that persons serving a life sentence” are civilly dead and thus
“prohibited from asserting civil actions,” those individuals are
entirely without recourse. 20 Accordingly, the court affirmed that
Gallop’s negligence claim was “prudently and accurately dismissed”
because he is serving a life sentence.21 It would have been an error
and an “excess of jurisdiction,” the court reasoned, for a lifeprisoner’s claims to be considered by a trial court when the state
has pronounced him civilly dead.22 The court, however, did not stop
there.
Just before the trial court dismissed the case, the plaintiff in
Gallop “moved for leave to file a second amended complaint” in an
attempt to raise constitutional claims. 23 The trial judge, however,
dismissed Gallop’s negligence claims without addressing or ruling
on his motion to amend. 24 On appeal, the Gallop court explained
that it did not have the power to review a trial court’s ruling on a
motion “for abuse of discretion if the trial justice ha[d] not exercised
that discretion.” 25 Confusingly, however, the court concluded that
the plaintiff, who the court had just affirmed to be unambiguously
without the capacity to bring a negligence action in the first
instance, somehow remained “entitled, at the very least, to a
reasoned decision on his motion to file an amended complaint.” 26
With no further explanation of how a civilly dead person can be
prohibited from bringing all claims in court, yet be entitled to a
ruling on a motion to amend the very claim he is prohibited from
bringing, one can see that the state of civil death in Rhode Island is
left with more access-to-courts problems after Gallop than before
the ruling. 27
19. Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 198 (R.I. 1984). “The
total denial of access to the courts for adjudication of a claim even before it
arises, however, most certainly ‘flies in the face of the constitutional command
found in art. 1, § 5,’ . . . and to hold otherwise would be to render this
constitutional protection worthless.” Id. (quoting Lemoine v. Martineau, 342
A.2d 616, 621 (R.I. 1975)).
20. Gallop, 182 A.3d at 1143.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1143–44.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1145.
26. Id.
27. See id.
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II. RHODE ISLAND’S CIVIL DEATH STATUTE IS PATENTLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE ACCESS TO COURTS CLAUSE

Article I, section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution provides
that “[e]very person within this state ought to find a certain
remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or
wrongs . . .” and should “obtain right and justice freely . . .
completely and without denial.” 28 By the plain language of this
constitutional mandate, a layperson could easily articulate the
irreconcilable contradiction created by application of the civil death
statute. Rhode Island is not the first state to find itself home to this
dilemma, as at least three other states with constitutional
provisions closely mirroring the language of Rhode Island’s AC
Clause have solved the issue in their courts.29 This section will use
the jurisprudence of Florida and Oklahoma courts as guideposts to
lay the foundation for Rhode Island to invalidate the civil death
statue as a violation of the state’s AC Clause.
A. Florida Jurisprudence Requires Strict Scrutiny of Access-toCourts Barriers
Florida has confronted the constitutionality of civil death, and
other bars imposed on prisoner litigation, in light of its own
constitutional guarantee of access to courts. The AC Clause of
Florida’s Constitution reads: “The courts shall be open to every
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial or delay.” 30 In Lloyd v. Farkash, the First
District Court of Appeal of Florida scrutinized the constitutionality
of Florida’s civil death statute “insofar as it purport[ed] to deprive
convicted felons of their right to bring civil actions.” 31 Specifically,
the Florida civil death statute provided that “upon conviction for
felony, the civil rights of the person convicted shall be
suspended . . . .” 32
1.

Florida’s Civil Death Statute Impermissibly Abolished
Prisoners’ Right to Access Courts and Provided No Reasonable

28. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5.
29. See Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001); Chesapeake Utils.
Corp. v. Hopkins, 340 A.2d 154 (Del. 1975); Davis v. Pullium, 484 P.2d 1306
(Okla. 1971); Lloyd v. Farkash, 476 So. 2d 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
30. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
31. 476 So. 2d at 308.
32. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.292 (West 1997).
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Alternative in the Absence of an Overpowering Public Necessity
In Lloyd, the court explained that “courts have an even greater
duty to protect” rights that are “made express by the constitution,”
such as the rights guaranteed by an AC Clause, than rights
extended only by implication.33 As such, the court scrutinized the
civil death statute using the analysis set forth by the Florida
Supreme Court in Kluger v. White, to be employed in cases involving
a bar of the right to access courts.34 Florida’s Kluger test requires
a three-pronged analysis whereby “the Legislature may only
abolish [the right to gain access to courts] if it has provided a
reasonable alternative, it has shown an overpowering public
necessity for the abolishment of the right, and there is no
alternative method of remedying” the public necessity.35 Crucially,
“there is no relevant difference between the . . . test set forth in
Kluger” and the analysis traditionally undertaken in strict scrutiny
review. 36
In Lloyd, the court applied the Kluger strict scrutiny analysis
to Florida’s civil death statute to determine whether the statute
violated the AC Clause of the Florida Constitution. 37 The Lloyd
court determined that Florida’s civil death statute violated the AC
Clause because it stripped convicted felons of all civil rights, and
such a broad prohibition plainly “deprive[d] convicted felons of their
right to bring civil actions in state courts . . .” without providing any
alternative. 38
The court in Lloyd was willing to entertain the argument that
“some legitimate purposes may be served by denying inmates
access to the courts,” such as preventing frivolous prisoner
litigation and avoiding “administrative inconvenience[s].” 39
Nevertheless, the court held that such interests were “insufficient
to override the constitutional right of access to courts.” 40
Accordingly, the court unequivocally declared that it does “not
believe that an overpowering public necessity for the suspension” of

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 307.
Id. at 308 (citing Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973)).
Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001).
Id. at 528.
Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 308.
Id.
Id. at 307.
Id.
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convicted felons’ right to access state courts “can be shown.” 41 The
distinction between the Lloyd court’s use of the words “can be
shown,” rather than “has been shown,” is crucial.42
The
significance of such a distinction is the Lloyd court’s belief that no
overpowering public necessity could justify upholding a similar
restriction on life-prisoners’ right to access courts in a future case.43
The court thus found it unnecessary to analyze the third Kluger
prong and ended its inquiry by concluding that Florida’s civil death
statute did in fact violate Florida’s AC Clause.44
2.

A Public Interest in Preventing Frivolous Litigation Does Not
Justify a Complete Bar of Prisoners’ Right to Access Courts

Although the Lloyd court declined to address whether there
were alternative methods for addressing some overpowering public
interest, the Florida Supreme Court has provided some guidance
with respect to the third prong of the analysis. 45 In Mitchell v.
Moore, the Florida Supreme Court applied the Kluger strict
scrutiny analysis to Florida’s “Prisoner Indigency Statute” (PIS).46
Because the PIS effectively barred life-prisoners from asserting all
civil actions, the law was analytically equivalent to the bar imposed
by a civil death statute.47 The court found that the restriction
created “procedural pitfalls so difficult and time-consuming” as to
“become a door to the Court that some inmates simply cannot
open.” 48
Having concluded that the PIS infringed prisoners’ “right to
seek redress for any type of injury or complaint of any kind in any
civil case that requires a filing fee,” the court looked to whether
there was an overpowering public necessity for such an imposition
on prisoners’ express right to access courts under Florida’s AC
Clause. 49 In doing so, the court noted that preventing “frivolous or
malicious civil actions” was the only public necessity identified by

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 528 (Fla. 2001).
Id. at 525; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.085 (West 2014).
See Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 525.
Id.
Id. at 527.

408 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:400
the Florida Legislature in enacting the PIS. 50
Without determining whether preventing frivolous litigation is
an overpowering public necessity, the court found that the PIS was
not narrowly tailored to such an interest. 51 Specifically, the
statute’s “copy requirement restrict[ed] and impede[d] the filing of
many more types of inmate petitions than the types of inmate
petitions which were identified . . . .” 52 Therefore, the court held
that even if preventing frivolous litigation was an overpowering
public necessity, alternative and more narrowly tailored remedies
for such a public interest plainly exist.53 As such, the court
concluded that the PIS could not pass the Kluger strict scrutiny
analysis.54
B. Oklahoma Adamantly Denounced Civil Death as
Unconscionable Legal Fiction Which Necessarily Creates
Absurd Results
Oklahoma has similarly faced the task of scrutinizing the
constitutionality of civil death in light of its own constitutional
guarantee of access to the courts. 55 Oklahoma’s AC Clause is
nearly identical to Rhode Island’s, and provides that “[t]he courts
of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy and
certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to
person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be
administrated without sale, denial, delay or prejudice.”56 In Davis
v. Pullium, the Oklahoma Supreme Court sought to determine
whether a state negligence action was properly dismissed by
operation of Oklahoma’s civil death statute. 57 The statute provided
that “a person sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison for
life, is thereby deemed civilly dead.” 58
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Davis held that the civil
death statute violated Oklahoma’s AC Clause, and saw an
opportunity to highlight the absurdity of civil death. 59 There, the
50. Id. at 528.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Davis v. Pullium, 484 P.2d 1306 (Okla. 1971).
56. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
57. Davis, 484 P.2d at 1308.
58. Id. at 1307.
59. See id. at 1308.
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court actively engaged in the legal fiction contained in civil death
statutes and zealously defended life-prisoners’ right to access
courts. 60 The court first noted the irony in that, despite having
been pronounced civilly dead by the state, “[Davis] was allowed his
mortal existence” by personally appearing at trial, and
“nevertheless remain[ed] a person and a citizen.” 61 The court
passionately declared that, even though “a convicted felon may be
disenfranchised [and] denied . . . the full fruits of citizenship, he
nevertheless cannot be regarded as human waste.” 62 The court
thus established that, as a matter of public policy, deeming lifeprisoners civilly dead is less than humane and not in accord with a
basic understanding of reality.63
The court further reasoned that Oklahoma’s civil death statute
“could produce preposterous arguments and conclusions,” and
provided two examples. 64 First, the court proposed that a person
on trial for murder could no more be convicted of killing a civilly
dead person than be sued in tort by the same, under the full effect
of the civil death statute. 65 Second, the court explained that a
civilly dead person could refuse to pay his taxes, “on the theory that
only the living are required to pay.” 66 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court made clear that the only way to avoid these preposterous
situations is by selective and arbitrary application of a law, which,
by its own language, makes no such attempt to enumerate or
distinguish hypothetical situations from those warranting its
application.67
The court concluded that civil death statues are a significant
“infringement upon the spirit of our system of government,” and
“are not of harmony with the spirit of our fundamental laws.”68 In
doing so, the court made clear that this “constitutional mandate
ha[d] made [its] course sure and certain” and declared that “actions
affecting [a civilly dead person’s] existence, safety and personal
liberties are natural rights which are fully and perpetually
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id.; see also 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (1956).
68. Davis, 484 P.2d at 1308 (quoting Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 P.2d
948, 948 (Okla. 1913)).
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protected.” 69 The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Davis thus
demonstrated an alternate approach to invalidating a civil death
statue insofar as it purports to negate the guarantees of an AC
Clause like Rhode Island’s. 70
C. Challenging Rhode Island’s Civil Death Statute Under the
Access to Courts Clause
The AC Clause of Rhode Island’s Constitution guarantees
access to courts for all people in Rhode Island. 71 Like the Lloyd
court’s duty to protect express rights to an even greater extent than
implied rights, “[a] basic premise of constitutional interpretation [in
Rhode Island] is that every clause must be given its due force,
meaning, and effect,” and, “to hold otherwise would be to render
[express] constitutional protection worthless.” 72 The fulfillment of
this duty requires Rhode Island courts to strictly scrutinize
attempts by the state legislature to strip its inhabitants of rights
guaranteed to them by the Rhode Island Constitution. 73 As such,
Rhode Island courts should only uphold obstructions to express
constitutional rights, like the access-to-courts bar imposed by the
civil death statute, when an overpowering public necessity exists to
which there is no alternative remedy but to abolish the right. 74 In
other words, the civil death statute should be analyzed with strict
scrutiny when challenged on AC Clause grounds.
1.

Strict Scrutiny of Rhode Island’s Civil Death Statute

The plain language of Rhode Island’s civil death statute
imposes a complete bar on life-prisoners’ right to access courts, and
likewise provides no alternative to that right.75 As such, Rhode
Island’s civil death statute is “a door to the [c]ourt” that cannot be
opened, and the Gallop court made that clear by stating that “the
Legislature has . . . mandated that persons serving a life sentence
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5.
72. Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 198 (R.I. 1985); Lloyd
v. Farkash, 476 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
73. See Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 307.
74. See id. at 307–08.
75. 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (1956). “Every person imprisoned . . . for
life shall, with respect to . . . all civil rights and relations of any nature
whatsoever, be deemed to be dead in all respects, as if his or her natural death
had taken place . . . .” Id.
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are prohibited from asserting civil actions . . . [and] thus he is
without recourse.” 76 Such a mandate, however, is invalid under
Rhode Island’s AC Clause, unless it is the only available “method of
remedying” an overpowering public interest, which justifies such a
bar on prisoners’ right to access courts. 77
In nearly all civil death-related access-to-courts cases, the only
public interest consistently advanced is the interest in preventing
frivolous litigation. 78 The Lloyd court, however, concluded that
such an interest is “insufficient to” justify a complete bar of the
right to access courts, holding that no “overpowering public
necessity for [such a bar] can be shown.” 79 Similarly, the Mitchell
court stopped short of concluding that the interest in preventing
frivolous litigation is an overpowering public necessity. 80 Rhode
Island courts must agree that preventing frivolous prisoner
litigation is insufficient to justify the complete prohibition of their
right to access courts. 81 To find otherwise would be to perpetrate
the ancient and punitively conservative myth that life-prisoners
cease to be counted as members of society upon conviction, which
empowers the farcical belief that preventing life-prisoners from
pursuing claims is a civilized response to any state interest. 82
While it may be true that “some legitimate purposes may be served
by denying inmates access to the courts,” it is clear that such
interests are not strong enough to save the civil death statute.83
Even if Rhode Island courts find that preventing frivolous
claims is an overpowering public necessity, they must also find that
the civil death statute is narrowly tailored to that interest if the
statute is to survive an AC Clause challenge.84 Rhode Island’s civil
76. Gallop v. Adult Corr. Insts., 182 A.3d 1137, 1143 (R.I. 2018); see
Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 525 (Fla. 2001).
77. See Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 527; Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 307–08.
78. See, e.g., Thompson v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Mo. 1976);
Delorme v. Pierce Freightlines Co., 353 F. Supp. 258 (D. Or. 1973); Mitchell v.
Moore, 786 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001); Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. Hopkins, 340
A.2d 154 (Del. 1975); Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215 (Alaska 1973); Davis v.
Pullium, 484 P.2d 1306 (Okla. 1971); Lloyd v. Farkash, 476 So. 2d 305 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Bilello v. A. J. Eckert Co., 346 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. App. Div.
1973).
79. Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 307–08.
80. Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 528.
81. See Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 307.
82. See SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 40.
83. See Lloyd, 476 So. 2d at 307.
84. See Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 528.
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death statute “restricts and impedes the filing of many more types
of inmate petitions than” merely frivolous or malicious claims. 85 As
such, it cannot be said that there are “‘no alternative method of
correcting’” a frivolous prisoner-litigation problem. 86 For example,
a statute would more narrowly address the issue if it prescribed a
process by which prisoners’ claims are determined to be either
meritorious or frivolous before they may be litigated.87 Another
alternative might be to enumerate certain predetermined causes of
action as per se meritorious, or prohibited, for the purposes of
initiating litigation like any other person. It is clear that if
preventing frivolous litigation is deemed to be an overpowering
public interest, a law addressing that interest must be much more
narrowly tailored than the civil death statute to withstand
constitutional challenges.
2.

Invalidating the Civil Death Statute Is Supported by
Compelling Policy Arguments

Similar to the irony observed in Davis, a life-prisoner in Rhode
Island exists in a fictitious, yet legally recognized, state of being
wherein the government considers his natural death to have taken
place despite the fact that he “nevertheless remains a [living]
person and a citizen.” 88 Rhode Island’s civil death statute likewise
unapologetically converts life-prisoners into “human waste” by
terminating not just their right to access courts, but “all civil rights
and relations of any nature whatsoever.”89
Additionally, the Davis court’s concern for “preposterous
arguments and conclusions,” which inevitably arise from a literal
interpretation of a civil death statute, is of equal concern to Rhode
Island. 90 Like the hypothetical civilly dead person who could refuse
to pay his taxes because only living people pay taxes, or the
hypothetical murderer who could never be charged for killing a
civilly dead person, preposterous conclusions such as these can only
be avoided in Rhode Island by an inconsistent and arbitrary
application of the civil death statute.91 Nevertheless, the court in
85. Id.
86. Id. at 527.
87. Id.
88. Davis v. Pullium, 484 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Okla. 1971).
89. 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (1956); see Davis, 484 P.2d at 1308.
90. See Davis, 484 P.2d at 1308.
91. See id.
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Gallop refused to recognize any such selective application when it
declined to read an exception into the civil death statute, stating
that the statute “is clear and unambiguous on its face and should
be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning . . . .” 92
In declining to do so, however, the court created one such
preposterous conclusion when it stated that a civilly dead person is
prohibited from asserting claims in court because he is considered
dead, but remains entitled to a ruling on a motion to amend the
very claim which his imaginary death precludes him from
bringing.93 As such, Gallop’s puzzling holding offers uncertain
operational utility, undermines the authority of the AC Clause, and
further highlights the need to repeal the civil death statute.
In sum, Rhode Island’s civil death statute must be invalidated
as an impermissible bar on life-prisoners’ right to access courts in
violation of the plain language of the AC Clause, which is neither
supported by an overwhelming public necessity nor strictly tailored
to such an interest. Indeed, “[i]f the constitutional guarantee of
right of access to the courts is to have any meaning, this statute
must be struck down.” 94 Courts in Rhode Island must conclude that
the civil death statute is neither in accord with “the spirit of our
system of government” in Rhode Island, nor in “harmony with the
spirit of our fundamental law,” because its affect is to regard lifeprisoners as human waste and to create unsustainable works of
legal fiction. 95
For these same reasons, the Rhode Island Legislature would be
equally remiss if it failed to repeal the civil death statute, and
thereby put an end to “medieval jurisprudence” in Rhode Island. 96
Rhode Island must strive, like Oklahoma did in 1971, to realize the
“existence, safety and personal liberties” of convicted felons––and
of all people––as “natural rights which are fully and perpetually
protected.” 97
III. RHODE ISLAND’S CIVIL DEATH STATUTE REMAINS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACCESS-TO-COURTS BARRIER UNDER LEWIS V.

92. Gallop v. Adult Corr. Insts., 182 A.3d 1137, 1141 (R.I. 2018).
93. Id. at 1144–45.
94. Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 199 (R.I. 1985).
95. See Davis, 484 P.2d at 1308.
96. See id.; Eisenman, supra note 5, at 170.
97. See Davis, 484 P.2d at 1308.
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CASEY IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Another basis by which some states have invalidated civil
death statues is on the grounds that they impermissibly bar lifeprisoners’ ability to access courts in violation of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 98 The United States Supreme Court
has, since at least 1940, recognized an evolving view of prisoners’
right to access courts. 99 This Part will explain why the civil death
statute should be invalidated as an unconstitutional burden on
prisoners’ right to access courts in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, even under the restrictive holding of Lewis v.
Casey.100
A. Access-to-Courts Challenges Under Boddie v. Connecticut
In Boddie v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court
held unconstitutional a state statute that prevented individuals
who were unable to pay a filing fee from accessing courts to obtain
a divorce. 101 The Court emphasized that American courts are
entrusted with protecting “individual rights and duties,” by
implementing a “regularized, orderly process of dispute
settlement.” 102 The Court explained that a state’s “obligations
under the Fourteenth Amendment are not simply generalized ones;
rather the State owes to each individual that process which, in light
of the values of a free society, can be characterized as due.”103 In
doing so, the Court made clear that to no degree “less than [cases
involving religious freedom, free speech or assembly], the right to a
98. See Thompson v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878, 878 (W.D. Mo. 1976); see also
Delorme v. Pierce Freightlines Co., 353 F. Supp. 258, 258 (D. Or. 1973); Bush
v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1215 (Alaska 1973).
99. David Steinberger, Lewis v. Casey: Tightening the Boundaries of
Prisoner Access to the Courts?, 18 PACE L. REV. 377, 389 (1998).
100. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 343 (1996).
101. 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971).
102. See id. at 375.
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more
fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules . . .
enabling them to . . . definitively settle their differences in an orderly,
predictable manner . . . . [I]t is this injection of the rule of law that
allows society to reap the benefits of rejecting what political theorists
call the “state of nature.”
Id. at 374.
103. Id. at 380.
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meaningful opportunity to be heard within the limits of
practicability, must be protected” from laws which seek to suppress
that right. 104 The Court in Boddie thus reasoned that “where a
state commands a monopoly over the only available legitimate
means of dispute settlement and the relationship underlying the
dispute is warp and woof of the fabric of society, [a] state may not
deny” completely prisoners’ right to access courts.105
In Bush v. Reid, the Alaska Supreme Court applied the Boddie
holding to the question of parolees’ right to access courts, and
regarded the holding as the “starting point” for challenging a bar to
this right. 106 The court first determined that access to courts is the
only recourse available to an injured American citizen whose
injurer will not voluntarily remedy his condition. 107 Second, the
court unequivocally declared that “the denial of access to the civil
courts rends the fabric of justice as surely . . . as [the ability to
access family courts to obtain a divorce] in Boddie,” because “the
very quality of [one’s] future existence may be dependent upon the
outcome.” 108 Because there are no significant alternative means of
obtaining relief when a statute places a complete bar on access to
courts, the threshold inquiry of the Boddie analysis was satisfied in
Bush. 109
The Alaska Supreme Court also reasoned that another
fundamental interest exists by which to invoke the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 110 The court explained that Bush’s
personal injury claim was a form of property, known as a “chose in
action.” 111 The court thus reasoned that “deprivation of access to
the courts . . . deprives [a] claimant of the whole value of his
104. Id. at 379.
105. Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Alaska 1973); see generally Boddie,
401 U.S. at 371.
106. Bush, 516 P.2d at 1218.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1218–19.
In Boddie Justice Harlan sought the fundamental human relationship
doctrine to satisfy the due process clause only because denial of access
to a divorce court does not impair a simpler ‘liberty or property’
interest . . . . [which would] justify] access to the particular dispute
resolution process [and thereby] actuate [Fourteenth Amendment
protection].
Id.
111. Id. at 1219.
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property . . . [and] is no less severe than the taking of disputed
wages or property during the pendency of litigation.” 112
The court concluded that such a deprivation of the right to
access courts “condemn[s] [the deprived] to suffer a grievous loss of
. . . rights protected by the [D]ue [P]rocess clause of the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment of the United States Constitution.”113 In balancing
the competing interests for such a deprivation, the court identified
as potential state interests the “fears of disruption of prison routine,
spurious litigation . . . and increased risk of escape.” 114 The court
concluded, however, that with respect to parolees, these arguments
satisfied neither strict scrutiny, nor rational review. 115 The court
likewise found, for the same reasons, that the statute also violated
the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Alaska
Constitutions. 116 Crucially, the court added that civil death
“violates the spirit and intention of the Alaska Constitution” and
that the Court would thus “not be impeded in [its] constitutional
progress by a narrower holding of the United States Supreme
Court.” 117
Other courts have reached similar holdings in the context of
life-prisoners who have not been released on parole. 118 In
Thompson v. Bond, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri conducted a strict scrutiny analysis of
Missouri’s civil death statute. 119 There, the court held that
preventing frivolous litigation and preserving prison routine were
insufficient interests to justify “the statute’s substantial
infringement upon [life-prisoners’] fundamental rights.” 120 The
court found “no data or . . . evidence to show that prisoners are
112. Id. “The judicial process exists to reduce inchoate claims to money
judgment where private settlement is unavailing (or to extinguish them as
non-meritorious).” Id. “Unlitigated claims for personal injury have slight
market value.” Id.
113. Id. “We further declare that we would reach an identical result in
interpreting the due process provisions of the Alaska Constitution alone,
finding as we do that Justice Harlan’s insightful analysis of the social compact
applies with equal force to our constitution.” Id.
114. Id. at 1220.
115. Id. at 1220–21.
116. Id. at 1220.
117. Id. at 1219–20.
118. See Thompson v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Delorme v.
Pierce Freightlines Co., 353 F. Supp. 258, 260 (D. Or. 1973); see also Bilello v.
A. J. Eckert Co., 346 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
119. See Thompson, 421 F. Supp. at 878.
120. Id. at 884.
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inherently inclined to file spurious lawsuits.” 121 Crucially, the
court determined that even if prisoners were so inclined,
“foreclosing the filing of all prisoner suits, regardless of their merit,
would be overbroad.” 122 As such, Missouri’s civil death statute was
thus invalidated as a violation of life-prisoners’ “right to due process
of law” insofar as it terminated their capacity to access courts.
After Boddie, the general right of access to courts in the context
of prisoners was initially reinforced by the United States Supreme
Court in Bounds v. Smith. 123 In Bounds, the Court was concerned
with “whether [s]tates must protect the right of prisoners to
access . . . courts by providing them with law libraries or
alternative sources of legal knowledge.” 124 Importantly, the Court
expressly “established beyond doubt that prisoners have a
constitutional right of access to the courts.” 125 Bounds has been
called “the benchmark” access-to-courts case because it held that
all people, including prisoners, have a “fundamental constitutional
right of access to the courts.” 126 This right “requires prison
authorities to assist inmates in preparation and filing of
meaningful legal papers,” and thus necessarily implies that states
may not completely bar life-prisoners from accessing courts.127
B. Access-to-Courts Challenges After Lewis v. Casey
The United States Supreme Court changed its approach to
prisoner access-to-courts challenges in Lewis v. Casey, where it
revisited the implications of its holding in Bounds. 128 In Lewis, the
Court held first that “in order to establish a violation of Bounds, an
inmate must show that the alleged inadequacies . . . caused him
‘actual injury . . . .’” 129 Secondly, and crucially, “[t]he Court
emphasized that the right of access [to courts] for prisoners, like all
prisoners’ rights, is evaluated under rational basis review . . . .” 130
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
124. Id. at 817.
125. Id. at 821.
126. Id. at 828; Steinberger, supra note, 99 at 378.
127. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
128. See 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996) (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828).
129. Id. at 348.
130. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 10.9 (4th ed. 2011).
“[A] prison regulation impinging on inmates’
constitutional rights ‘is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
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Additionally, the Court was careful to point out that “several
statements in Bounds went beyond the right of access [to courts]
recognized in the earlier cases on which it relied . . . .” 131
Specifically, statements in Bounds, which “appear to suggest that
[a] [s]tate must enable [a] prisoner to discover grievances, and to
litigate effectively once in court” must now be disclaimed. 132 The
Court explained that the Constitution does not require “the
conferral of such sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly
uneducated and indeed largely illiterate prison population . . . .” 133
Despite significantly walking-back its previous holdings, the Lewis
Court nevertheless conceded that “[t]he right that Bounds
acknowledged was the (already well-established) right of access to
the courts.” 134
C. Challenging Rhode Island’s Civil Death Statute Under Lewis
It has been said that Lewis represented a “drastic attempt to
limit the . . . constitutional right of inmates to meaningful[ly]”
access courts. 135 While this may be true, civilly dead life-prisoners
in Rhode Island have more significant access-to-courts barriers
than the availability of a law library or legal assistance. Rhode
Island’s civil death statute precludes would-be life-prisoner
claimants, like Gallop, from accessing “the only available legitimate
means of dispute settlement,” by prohibiting their access to civil
courts. 136 Further, the complete denial of Gallop’s and other lifeprisoners’ access to “civil courts rends the fabric of justice as surely”
in Rhode Island as it did in Connecticut or Alaska. 137 Likewise, to
the extent that Rhode Island recognizes claimants as possessing a
“chose in action” property right, the civil death statute deprives lifeprisoners of the entire value of that right. 138 As such, the civilly
dead in Rhode Island meet the criteria for initiating a Due Process

interests.’” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987)).
131. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354.
132. Id. (emphasis in original).
133. Id. The Lewis opinion, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, indeed
made no attempt to conceal its operating prejudice against prisoners. See id.
134. Id. at 350 (emphasis in original).
135. Steinberger, supra note 99, at 378.
136. See Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Alaska 1973).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1219.
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and Equal Protection challenge under the Boddie framework. 139
Under Lewis, however, a life-prisoner in Rhode Island
asserting that the statute unconstitutionally bars his right to access
courts must show an actual injury, “such as the inability to meet a
filing deadline or to present a claim.” 140 Unlike the hypothetical
life-prisoner anticipated in Lewis, who is not injured by a state’s
failure to “confe[r] . . . sophisticated legal capabilities” with which
to litigate his claims, life-prisoners in Rhode Island suffer actual
injury when their claims are dismissed by mandate of the civil
death statute. 141 Gallop’s actual injury, which was a complete bar
on his capacity to access courts, is incomparable to the injury of a
prisoner who merely does not have access to an adequate law
library to research the claims that he has the capacity to bring.142
As such, life-prisoners in Rhode Island meet the Lewis “actual
injury” requirement.
Although Bush involved parolees, the Court’s rationale is
directly applicable to Rhode Island’s civil death statute, which
makes no exception for life-prisoners who are later paroled. 143 Just
as in Alaska, there is an “utter vacancy of rationale” for preventing
a paroled life-prisoner in Rhode Island from accessing courts, even
under the “more lenient ‘rational basis’ test” prescribed by Lewis.144
The same vacancy of rationale exists for preventing lifeprisoners who are not released on parole from accessing courts.
There is no data or evidence to support the argument that lifeprisoners are “inherently inclined” to pursue frivolous litigation. 145
Rhode Island’s civil death statute, of course, prevents all lifeprisoners from asserting all claims.146 Even if preventing frivolous
litigation is a legitimate state interest under Lewis, the civil death
statute still cannot survive rational basis review because it makes
139. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971); see also Bush, 515
P.2d at 1218.
140. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348 (1996).
141. See id. at 354.
142. See Gallop v. Adult Corr. Insts., 182 A.3d 1137, 1141 (R.I. 2018).
143. 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (1956). “In the case of a prisoner sentenced
to imprisonment for life, a parole permit may be issued at any time after the
prisoner has served not less than ten (10) years imprisonment,” provided that
other criteria, accounting for the severity of the crime, are met. Id. § 13-813(a).
144. Bush, 516 P.2d at 1220, 1221; see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361.
145. See Thompson v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878, 884 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
146. 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1.
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no attempt to distinguish meritorious from frivolous claims.147
Such a draconian, blanket prohibition of the right to access courts
cannot reasonably be considered rationally related to the interest
in preventing frivolous litigation in a just, civilized state. There are
“[m]uch less onerous ways . . . available to protect the judicial
process” and routine prison activity from frivolous litigation than a
complete bar on “an entire class of litigants” like life-prisoners.148
One can see that the only true rationale for preventing lifeprisoners from bringing good-faith, meritorious claims is the
farcical and punitively conservative view of life-prisoners as nonliving “human waste,” who are not entitled to their rights as
citizens.149
In short, the civil death statute remains an
impermissible access-to-courts barrier, despite the narrowing of the
Supreme Court’s access-to-courts doctrine in Lewis, and must be
invalidated as a violation of Rhode Island life-prisoners’ right to
access to courts under Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
147. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361.
148. Delorme v. Pierce Freightlines Co., 353 F. Supp. 258, 260 (D. Or. 1973)
(holding that state-defendants failed to show that a civil death’s bar on access
to courts was rationally related to the interest in preventing frivolous
litigation).
In most instances . . . prisoners need not be brought to the courtroom
to resolve a civil matter. Where the prisoner’s testimony is important,
the court can direct him to submit an affidavit or suggest a deposition
at the prison. Various courts have ruled that a prisoner has no
constitutional right to be present at a civil trial . . . and therefore a
civil suit need not necessarily disrupt the prison routine by requiring
transportation to and from the court.
Thompson, 421 F. Supp. at 884–85.
149. Davis v. Pullium, 484 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Okla. 1971).
Although there is no Rhode Island legislative history available that
would shed light on the purpose of Section 13–6–1, the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island has indicated that the provision “was intended to be
a limitation on the assertion of any rights by a prisoner serving a life
sentence.”
Ferreira v. Wall, C.A. No. 15-219-ML, 2016 WL 8235110, at *2 (D. R.I. Oct. 26,
2016) (quoting Bogosian v. Vaccaro, 422 A.2d 1253, 1254 (R.I. 1980)). Such a
vague and undefined state interest, which amounts to no more than a
threadbare paraphrasing of the civil death statute’s text, is repugnant to the
very spirit and intention of the Rhode Island and United States Constitutions,
and thus is not a legitimate state interest which would save the civil death
statute. A statute that terminates all of a person’s “rights of property . . . the
bond of matrimony and . . . all civil rights and relations of any nature
whatsoever,” simply is not rationally related to criminal punishment. See § 136-1.
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Constitution.150
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Legislature must recognize the improvident
nature of the civil death statute and repeal it. Alternatively, Rhode
Island courts must invalidate the statute as an impermissible bar
on life-prisoners’ right to access courts in violation of the AC Clause
of the Rhode Island Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Rhode Island must join its peers
in the realization that “the concept of civil death has been
condemned by virtually every court and commentator to study it
[since the 1940s].” 151 The uncomfortable truth that Alaska,
Florida, Missouri, and Oklahoma in the 1970s and 1980s
represented a more progressive iteration of criminal justice, which
afforded more rights to its prisoners than does Rhode Island in
2019, cannot be overstated, and is an authoritarian stain on the
conscience of a state which is at times a leading example of social
values. 152 So long as Rhode Island continues to give legitimacy to
the “vestige of medieval jurisprudence” that is its civil death
150. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350.
151. See Thompson, 421 F. Supp. at 885.
Finally, the Court cannot fail to note that the concept of civil death
has been condemned by virtually every court and commentator to
study it over the last thirty years. Only approximately 13 states have
yet to abolish their civil death statutes, and neither the practice
elsewhere nor any evidence mustered by defendants for this Court’s
attention indicates that abolition of civil death has adversely affected
prison routine or overburdened correctional administrators or state
courts in other jurisdictions.
Id.
152. See e.g., Act Abolishing Capital Punishment, R.I. DEP’T STATE,
http://sos.ri.gov/virtualarchives/items/show/484 [https://perma.cc/PCC6-97R2]
(last visited Apr. 5, 2019); Jacqueline Tempera & Patrick Anderson, R.I. Senate
Passes Bill Ending Life-Without-Parole Sentences For Juveniles, PROVIDENCE
J.
(June
15,
2017,
5:59
PM),
https://www.providencejournal.
com/news/20170615/ri-senate-passes-bill-ending-life-without-parolesentences-for-juveniles [https://perma.cc/7KTT-FV6V]; Nate Raymond, Rhode
Island Sues Major Oil Companies Over Climate Change, REUTERS (July 2,
2018,
1:59
PM),
https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/
idAFL1N1TY0MD [https://perma.cc/K36S-98MC]; Sheldon Whitehouse, Brett
Kavanaugh Hearing: Senate Republicans Have Worked Together With
Kavanaugh to Deny Dr. Ford a Fair Investigation, NBC NEWS (Sept. 27, 2018,
4:37
AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/kavanaugh-senaterepublicans-have-worked-together-deny-christine-blasey-ford-ncna913621
[https://perma.cc/K25L-L4NZ].

422 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:400
statute, it cannot achieve its fundamental ideal that “[e]very person
ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without purchase,
completely and without denial.”

